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TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION TO THE TRUSTEE OF
AN INTER VIVOS TRUST
George E. Palmer*

HE problem of this paper is narrow but important in connection
with testamentary dispositions.1 A man establishes an inter vivos
trust, in writing, and later attempts by will to add to the corpus of the
trust without repeating in the will the terms of the trust. In some instances he thereafter amends the trust with the expectation that the
property bequeathed to the trustee will be held in accordance with the
amended terms. This is a simple and convenient method of disposing
of property at death and most people probably would take for granted
that the disposition is effective. Yet in some situations it is almost
certainly not effective as intended and in others the risk of invalidity is
serious. Without adequate reason the law has departed too far from
the common understanding of those whose activities it regulates. It is
time to remedy the situation and a remedy will be suggested. First,
however, the present state of the law needs to be reviewed.

T

I
A. Irrevocable and Unaniendahle Trust
Where the testator has no power to either amend or revoke his inter
vivos trust, the testamentary addition to corpus can be accomplished in
most jurisdictions without repeating the terms of the trust. Most states
permit incorporation by reference, whereby a testator "incorporates"
into his will the terms of an existing writing. 2 In these states the mechanics of reference in the will to the existing trust instrument permits
effective disposition to the trustee to hold pursuant to the terms of the
trust.3 If the state rejects incorporation by reference,.the use of another
legal idea probably will save the bequest. The trust instrument has
"' Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
subject has been discussed in the following articles: Evans, "IncoIP9ration by
Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act," 25 CoL. L. REv. 879 (1925); Evans,
"Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference," 16 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 635
(1949); Scott, "Trusts and the Statute of Wills," 43 HAn.v. L. REv. 521 (1930); Lauritzen,
"Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated by Reference?" 45 h.L. L. REv. 583 (1950).
2 Dobie, "Testamentary Incorporation by Reference," 3 VA. L. REv. 583 (1916);
Evans, ''Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act," 25 CoL. L.
REv. 879 (1925); ATKINsoN, W1LLs 333 (1937); 1 PAGE, WILLS 497 (1941).
a Est. of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 P. 471 (1900); Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Cleveland, 291
Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
1 The
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independent significance as evidencing the creation and embodying
the terms of an inter vivos trust, or as sometimes said, its execution is
a nontestamentary act. A bequest to a trustee has been upheld on the
ground that meaning can be given to the will by reference to facts
having "independent" or "nontestamentary" signi6.cance.4 On one
theory or the other most jurisdictions will uphold the disposition. 5
The occasion for the development of these concepts has been the
normal requirement that property can be disposed of at death only by
a writing executed in accordance with the statute of wills. To give
meaning to this requirement it is generally necessary to put the essential terms of the disposition in that writing, that is, in the paper we
think of as the "will." In the case of incorporation by reference literal
compliance with this requirement is lacking6 unless the incorporated
paper is treated as an integral part of the instrument executed as the
will. For most purposes this may be the effect of incorporation, but it
has not been so regarded for all purposes; for example, the incorporated paper need not be present when the will is executed,7 though
su~h presence is demanded in order that a paper be considered -an
integral part of a will. 8 Nor is it necessary to probate the incorporated
paper as a part of the will, although apparently this may be done. 9
4 In re York's Est., 95 N.H. 435, 65 A. (2d) 282 (1949); Swetland v. Swetland, 102
N.J. Eq. 294, 140 A. 279 (1928); Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
5lncorporation by reference was rejected in Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 A.
1058 (1907), where the testator attempted to bequeath property to the trustee of a living
trust which apparently was neither amendable nor revocable. The opinion holding the
bequest ineffective seems to rule out the possibility of using the independent significance
theory to sustain the bequest, although the discussion centered on incorporation.
6 "But the statute does not confer upon any one the power of disposing of his property after death by will, unless by a writing containing in itself the bequest intended to be
made, denoted by language therein used, signed and attested with the prescribed public
formalities .•••" Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506 at 521, 65 A. 1058 (1907). See also,
Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891). The New York
decisions are discussed in REPORT OF nm LAw REVISION CoM:MISSION, STATE OF NEw
YoRK 431 (1935); Samuels, "Incorporation by Reference in New York Wills," 19 N.Y.
UNIV. L.Q. 270 (1942).
7 Est. of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 P. 471 (1900); ATKINSON, WILLS 332 (1937);
Evans, "Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act," 25 CoL. L.
REv. 879 at 888 (1925).
8 Bond v. Seawell, 3 Burr. 1773, 97 Eng. Rep. 1092 (1765); ATKINSON, WILLS 328
(1937); 1 PAGE, WILLS §247 (1941).
9 In re Jones, [1942] Ch.D. 328 at 329; Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass.
91 (1881); 2 PAGE, WILLS 67 (1941). Different views concerning treatment of the incorporated paper as an integral part of the will may account for a difference of opinion on
whether a holographic will may incorporate a paper which is not in the testator's handwriting. That this is not permissible was held in Hewes v. Hewes, llO Miss. 826 at 834,
71 S. 4 (1916) (''When an extrinsic document is incorporated into a will by a reference
thereto in the will, it becomes a part and parcel thereof ••."). Accord: Mechem, "The
Integration of Holographic Wills," 12 N.C. L. REv. 213 at 225-6, 229 (1934). Contra:
Est. of Plumel, 151 Cal. 77, 90 P. 192 (1907); ATKINSON, WILLS 338-9 (1937).
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Acceptance of incorporation by reference probably has resulted in part
from the pressure of the facts; people persist in writing wills this way.10
Moreover, the device fits into accepted lawyers' practices; for example,
in drawing pleadings.
The development of the independent significance theory has been
due to a recognition of certain inescapable facts concerning the interpretation of language. Courts still talk about getting the meaning of
a will from within its "four corners,"11 but it is always necessary that
language be related to extrinsic facts. A simple bequest to "my daughter Henrietta" can be given effect only by identifying Henrietta. A
bequest to the person who is the testator's wife at his death undoubtedly is valid, although it enables an unmarried testator to select his
legatee by acts which do not meet the formal requirements of the
statute of wills. Presumably his selection of a wife is influenced by
. h are "nontestamentary. " A b equest to "sueh persons as
factors wh1c
may be in my employ at my death" is upheld12 though there is a
possibility that the testator might use his power of selection simply as a
means of naming his legatees. Still, the selection normally will be made
for reasons unrelated to his will. These reasons give some assurance,
usually held in the cases to be adequate, that the legatees have been
freely chosen by the testator. The formalities of the statute of wills
serve no higher purpose. The same reasons justify the use of this theory
to support a bequest to the trustee of an inter vivas trnst.
Such a bequest also might be regarded as a gift to a trustee as a legal
entity with the evidence of the terms of the trust serving to identify the
legatee. This approach was suggested by Cardozo, who apparently
was not troubled by the fact that in connection yvith other problems a
10 In Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P.C. 427 at 456, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 at 768 (1858),
where it was held that the English Statute of Wills of 1837 did not disturb the earlier
recognition of incorporation by reference, the court observed that elimination of the doctrine
"would have occasioned, in many cases, great inconvenience and injustice."
11 "Taking the will by the four comers and examining it to ascertain the intent of the
testator, •••" George Washington Univ. v. Riggs Nat. Bank, (D.C. Cir. 1936) 88 F. (2d)
771 at 772. See generally, 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE §2461 (1940).
12 Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R.I. 213, 21 A. 364 (1891). See also Stubbs v. Sargon, 3
My. & Cr. 507, 40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1838), upholding a bequest to the persons "to whom
I may have disposed of my said business," where the testatrix was in business when the will
was made and thereafter during her lifetime disposed of the business. Similar decisions are
collected in a comment, 46 MicH. L. REv. 77 at 79-80 (1947). In Langdon v. Astor's
Executors, 16 N.Y. 9 (1857), the court concluded that reference may be made to a
"transaction belonging to the actual business of life" (id. 26) since there "is no special
danger that it may be simulated or set up by false testimony against the truth of the case"
(id. 27).
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trustee has not been recognized as a distinct legal personality.13 In
any event this approach and the independent significance theory rest
upon the same basic considerations. The use of the trust instrument is
a part of the process of interpretation, of giving meaning to the will by
reference to extrinsic facts, and the independent significance of the
instrument serves as a limiting factor.14

B. Amendable Trust
The trouble begins when the trust instrument reserves in the
settlor a power to amend. We should consider first the case in which
the power has not been exercised. Although a bequest to the trustee of
an amendable trust should be upheld, it is far from certain that it will
be. Even Professor Scott's statement that the bequest is effective by the
13 "In the view of the law, a corporation as an individual and a corporation as trustee
are separate legal personalities. • • • A gift to a trust company as trustee of a trust created
by a particular deed identifies the trust in describing the trustee. • • ." Matter of Rausch,
258 N.Y. 327 at 331, 179 N.E. 755 (1932). The personal liability of a trustee on contracts
he makes in the administration of the trust [2 Scon, TRUSTS §262 (1939)] rests upon
a failure to recognize the trustee as a distinct legal entity, as does the settled view that one
may not be trustee of a claim against himself. Molera v. Cooper, 173 Cal. 259, 160 P.
231 (1916); l Scon, TRuSTs §87 (1939).
14 " ••• the question is one as to the admissibility of extraneous evidence to explain
and make certain the language of the will and thus identify the persons who are to take
the residue and define their shares." Dissenting opinion of Judge Bingham in Atwood v.
Rhode Island Hospital Trust.Co., (1st Cir. 1921) 275 F. 513 at 525. Objection may be
made to treating the use of the trust instrument as an -aspect of the process of interpretation, on the ground that the will does not contain a "sufficient expression" of the gift.
[The phrase is taken from THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 443-44 (1898)].
It may be argued that extrinsic evidence is used to identify persons and property described
in the will and that a bequest to a trustee on the terms set forth in another writing simply
does not contain a sufficient description of the beneficiaries and the interests they are to
take. But what is the difference between a bequest to the persons "to whom I may have
disposed of my said business" (Stubbs v. Sargon, supra note 12) and a bequest to the
persons now or hereafter named as beneficiaries of a certain trust? The language of each
will provides the means of identifying the legatees; if there is any legally significant difference between the two bequests it lies in the character of the extrinsic evidence by which
the identification is made.
It has not been generally noticed that the use of the trust instrument, at least where
it was executed in connection with the making of the will, must be squared with the general rule that testator's declarations of intention are not admissible in construing a will.
9 WmMoRE, EVIDENCE §2471 (1940). Neither Wigmore (id. §2471) nor Thayer (PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 414,440) gives a wholly satisfactocy explanation of the
reason for this rule. I suggest that the independent significance factor is a general limitation on the use of all extrinsic evidence; that there is no special rule applicable to direct
statements of intention; that such statements are not excluded as such but only because
they have no substantial significance except to give meaning to the words of the will. In
this view, the important problem is the same whether the extrinsic evidence is of the sort
used in Stubbs v. Sargon or is the language of a trust instrument. It is the problem of
determining how far it is permissible to go in giving meaning to a will by the use of
extrinsic facts which were subject to a human control that could have been and perhaps
was aimed at disposing of property at death.
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"weight of authority"15 is difficult to support if one takes into account
the weight to be given the views of particular courts, whether the issue
was explicitly formulated and dealt with in an opinion, and similar
factors.
In Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.16 the decedent
established an inter vivos trust with a corpus of some two million dollars, reserving the power to "annul, change or modify" the terms of
the trust. The income was to be paid to the settlor for life; at his death
cash amounts were to be paid to named beneficiaries and the balance
of the corpus was to be held in trust to pay the income to his widow
and another for their lives, with the corpus then to be distributed to
other beneficiaries in stated fractional amounts. On the same day the
settlor also made a will in which he left the residue of his estate to the
trustee of the inter vivos trust, "to be held, managed and disposed of as
a part of the principal of the estate and property held by it in trust . . .
in the same manner as though [the property] had been deposited by
me as a part of said trust estate." Thereafter the settlor twice amended
the trust by naming additional cash beneficiaries and by eliminating
a gift of $3000 to one Amelia. The effect of these amendments was not
in issue. The cash gifts were paid out of the trust corpus to the named
beneficiaries, including those designated in the amendments, and no
issue was made with respect to this action. 17 The effect of the attempted
revocation of the gift to Amelia was not passed upon because she was
not a party to the proceeding.18 The issue on which the court did
pass was as to the validity of the entire residuary disposition. The holding against validity was based upon the fact that the settlor had reserved
the power to amend the trust, not upon the fact that the power was
exercised after execution of the will. This decision, coming from the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, is powerful authority against
the validity of a bequest to the trustee of an amendable trust. Moreover,
it is bolstered by a similar decision of the Court of Appeals for the
15

1 Scorr, TnusTs 297 (1939); Scott, ''The Law of Trusts, 1941-1945," 59 HAnv.

L. REv. 157 at 167 (1945). Lauritzen, "Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated by Reference?" 45 ILL. L. REv. 583 at 600 (1950), argues that the bequest is invalid by "the
weight of authority established by those American courts which have most carefully considered the problem. • ••"
16 (1st Cir. 1921) 275 F. 513.
17 The propriety of making these payments will be considered hereinafter.
1 8 Under the court's decision, however, the gift to Amelia would fail. Treating the
gift as payable out of the corpus of the inter vivas trust, it had been validly revoked.
Treating it as payable out of estate owned at death, the gift failed because of the holding
that the entire bequest to the trustee was ineffective.
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Second Circuit in Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,1 9 where another part of the same will was held ineffective on the authority of the
Atwood case.
The problem of the Atwood case is whether the bequest can be
upheld either on the ground that there was a valid incorporation by
reference or on the ground that the terms of the trust instrument were
facts of independent significance which could be used to give meaning
to the will. Apparently the court believed that the inapplicability of
incorporation by reference was too clear to merit discussion. Attention
was centered upon the use of the trust instrument as a fact of independent significance, with the conclusion that this theory did not save
the bequest. The reason given would apply whichever theory is used.
In the words of an English judge it was asserted that a "testator cannot
by his will prospectively create for himself a power to dispose of his
property by an instrument not duly executed as a will or codicil."20
This may be a useful generalization but if it is the Atwood decision
is a good example of the dangers involved in the undiscriminating use
of useful generalizations. The statement was used by the English
judge in explaining the rejection of a bequest to a trustee to hold on
the terms described in a letter prepared by the testator after execution
of his will. 21 There was no valid incorporation because the writing to
be incorporated was not in existence when the will was executed. The
independent significance theory was of no help since the sole purpose
of the letter was to define the terms of the testamentary trust. The
quoted statement doubtless is generally true but it has no application
to the Atwood situation. There the trust instrument was in existence
when the will was written so as to satisfy that requisite of incorporation;
moreover, it had substantial significance apart from the attempted use
of its provisions in giving meaning to the will. The power to amend
should not prevent the use of either theory. If a testator provided in the
body of his will for a method of changing the will without complying
with the statute of wills the provision of course would be ir~effective
but it would not invalidate the dispositive terms of the will. Similarly,
in Atwood, the attempted reservation of a similar power should at most
Cir. 1924) 298 F. 894.
F. 513 at 521.
21 Johnson v. Ball, 5 DeG. & Sm. 85, 64 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1851). The court in the
Atwood case could see no difference between this situation and the one before it, for it
relied upon the leading case of Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221 (1881). That case invalidated a bequest to a legatee to distribute "in such manner as in his discretion shall appear
best calculated to carry out wishes which I have expressed to him or may express to him."
19 (2d
20 275
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be disregarded-though whether effect can properly be given to later
amendments is a more serious question to be hereafter discussed.
I believe that the Atwood bequest should have been sustained as a
valid incorporation by reference. It is universally recognized that the
writing to be incorporated must be in existence when the will is executed,22 and it is commonly stated that the will must refer to it as in
existence.23 There is reason for the £.rst requirement. The provisions
of the statute of wills, if they are to have substantial meaning, seem
inescapably to prevent the use of a later writing which was not executed in conformity with the statute and which serves the sole purpose
of effecting disposition at death. 24 But the requirement of existence in
fact is satisfied where the trust instrument was not amended. 20 The
second requirement, of a reference to the writing as in existence, is
certainly not self-evident and strict insistence upon it probably has done
more harm than good. The real need is for language in the will which
expresses the purpose of incorporating a particular writing and describes
22 Bcyan's Appeal, 77 Conn. 240, 58 A. 748 (1904); Newton v. Seaman's Friend
Society, 130 Mass. 91 (1881); 1 PAGE, WILLS §260 (1941).
23 " ••• where there is a reference to any written document, described as then existing,
in such terms that it is capable of being ascertained, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain it, and the only question then is, whether the evidence is sufficient for the purpose."
Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P.C. 427 at 454, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 at 767 (1858). Accord:
1 PAGE, WILLS §257 (1941); ATKINSON, WILLS 335 (1937); Evans, "Incorporation by
Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentacy Act," 25 Cot. L. R:Ev. 879 at 881 (1925);
Bcyan's Appeal, 77 Conn. 240, 58 A. 748 (1904).
24 It is still possible, however, that the testator's wishes may be carried out through
the use of constructive trust theocy. It is generally recognized that if an outright bequest
is made to a legatee who promised either before or after execution of the will to hold the
property in trust, a constructive trust will be enforced against the legatee for the benefit
of the intended beneficiaries. 1 Scon-, TnusTs §55.1 (1939). In England and some
American jurisdictions, the same result has been reached where the will specified that the
legatee was to hold in trust but did not designate the beneficiaries. Id. §55.8. However,
the English decisions indicate that this will be limited to the situation in which the terms
of the intended trust were communicated to the legatee before or in connection with the
execution of the will. Johnson v. Ball, 5 DeG. & Sm. 85, 64 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1851); In
re Keen, [1937] Ch.D. 236. The reasons given for this limitation are inadequate and the
time factor has not been emphasized in the American decisions. See, e.g., Hartman's
Est. (No. 2), 320 Pa. 331, 182 A. 232 (1936). The Restatement of Trusts adopted the
minority American view that a constructive trust will be impressed on the property even
though the will shows that the legatee takes in trust, and states that it is inunaterial
whether the legatee's promise was made before or after execution of the will. Sec. 55, com.
h. The functional relationship of the constructive trust remedy and the doctrines of incorporation and independent significance is discussed in an excellent comment by Tolan in
46 MicH. L. R:Ev. 77 (1947).
25 In the Atwood case (supra note 16) the District Judge, who had upheld the bequest,
observed that the "reservation of a right to change does not destroy the actual existence of
the trust settlement••.." 264 F. 360 at 365 (1920).
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the writing with reasonable certainty. 26 In terms of incorporation the
important issue in the Atwood case is whether the language of the will
met this need.
Two situations have been presented in the cases, which should be
but have not been differentiated. Usually, the reference clause of the
will does not show that the trust is amendable. That fact appears only
from the provisions of the trust instrument. In a few reported cases the
language of the will itself attempted to make a disposition that would
adopt the terms of the trust as then written or as thereafter amended.
The Atwood will was of the first type but the court treated it as though
it were of the second.21 It is important then to consider whether the
disposition could have been sustained under the will as the court recast
it.
In Matter of Jones2 8 a bequest was made to a trustee on the trusts
contained in an instrument "executed by me bearing even date with this
my last will and testament or any substitution therefor or modification
thereof or addition thereto which I may hereafter execute." The bequest was held ineffective even though the trust instrument had not
been changed after execution of the will. 29 The road to this result was
26 Early English decisions on incorporation emphasized this factor; thus Lord Eldon
stated: "The rule of law is, that an instrument properly attested, in order to incorporate
another instrument not attested, must describe it so as to be a manifestation of what the
paper is, which is meant to be incorporated•••." Smart v. Prujean, 6 Ves. Jr. 560 at 565,
31 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1801). Insistence upon a reference to the writing as in existence has
had its most destructive effect in cases where the writing was prepared after the execution
of the will but before its republication by codicil. The execution of the codicil means that
the existence in fact requirement is satisfied. If, however, the original will referred to the
writing in the future tense, this language remains the same despite republication of the
will by the codicil. There are decisions rejecting incorporation. Goods of Smart, [1902]
P. 238. See note, 39 Mma. L. REv. 1055 (1941). A glaring example of insistence that
the testator use the correct tense is Durham v. Northen, [1895] P. 66, where the will
created a trust and directed the trustees to set apart a fund consisting of investments "which
the trustees will find noted by me for the purpose." A paper was found listing such properties but it was dated later than the will. A codicil to the will had been executed after
the date of this paper. Held, that the paper was not incorporated because the will "does
not refer to a document as existing." In referring to a comparable English decision, Wigmore commented: "why will judges be so complaisant to destroy testamentary acts which
are perfectly authentic and are obvious in their purport?" 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCB 167, note
(1940). Some American cases have been less insistent on use of the proper tense. Simon
v. Grayson, 15 Cal. (2d) 531, 102 P. (2d) 1081 (1940).
27 The court recast the will to read: "I give the residue of my estate to said Trust
Company to be disposed of to such persons and in such proportions as I may have instructed
or shall hereafter instruct said Trust Company." 275 F. 513 at 521.
28 [1942] Ch. 328, [1942] l All E.R. 642. Apparently there was no inter vivos trust
in this case. The trust instrument was prepared solely for use in connection with the will,
hence there was no possibility of applying the independent significance theory.
29 The court held that evidence concerning changes in the writing was inadmissible,
but counsel for the trustee stated in argument that the original writing had not been altered.
[1942] Ch. 328 at 329.
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winding. Testator meant the property to go either by the original terms
or by later alterations if any. If there were later alterations the disposition would be invalid since the later writing could not be incorporated.
The court could not receive evidence to show whether or not there was
a later writing, hence it had no way of knowing whether the first
writing was to control. It is difficult to know how to deal with such
refined nonsense. Surely there is a substantial difference between using
the language of a writing to express the essential terms of a testamentary
disposition, and using the absence of any such writing to validate
testamentary language that is otherwise effective. The court recognized
this when it suggested that the result might be different if the will
directs reference to a particular writing unless another writing is thereafter substituted. 30 In the case before it, an existing writing was described and a purpose was clearly expressed of making disposition by the
terms of that writing in the circumstances which occurred; this should
have sufficed.
Thus, if the will in the Atwood case had used the language which
the court imported, a valid incorporation should have been found, disregarding the amendments as the court did. As has been seen, however, the reference clause was of the common variety; that is, the fact
that the trust was amendable appeared only in the trust instrument itself. This presents a problem of construction which will be considered
later: did the testator mean to leave the residue pursuant to the existing
dispositive terms of the trust, or did he mean to include later amendments?
For the present the case will be discussed on the assumption made by the
court that later amendments were to be included. Even though the holding in the Jones case be accepted it is suggested that the actual will in
Atwood involves a controlling difference. The judge-made rules of incorporation have tended to become highly formalized; that is, they have taken on the outstanding characteristics of the rules embodied in the statute
of wills.31 In either case, if those rules are met the testamentary disposition should be sustained. This is a situation in which it should be
possible to give a man almost complete assurance that if certain minimum requirements are satisfied his will is valid insofar as validity turns
on form. Cases like Atwood have introduced unobtrusively a new idea
SOA like suggestion appears in University College of North Wales v. Taylor, [1908]
P. 140. In First-Central Tr. Co. v. Claflin, (Ohio C.P. 1947) 73 N.E. (2d) 388, the
court sustained a bequest "pursuant to the provisions in said trust instrument and amendments thereto."
31 The comment in 46 M:ccH. L. RBv. 77 (1947) demonstrates, however, that bequests
are frequently upheld in disregard of the formal rules of incorporation.
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into incorporation. T raclitionally the emphasis has been upon the language of the will. It must describe the extrinsic writing with reasonable
exactitude, show in some way that the testator intends to incorporate
that writing, and perhaps also describe the writing as in existence if
that can usefully be separated from the general description requirement.
The will in the Atwood case satisfied these requirements. If incorporation failed it was not because of any lack of form in the will, rather
it was because of something in the writing to be incorporated.
This departs from the. basic purpose of the requirements of incorporation. If a will satisfies the formalities of incorporation, the terms
of the writing referred to become operative as a part of the will. The
two instruments then are construed as a whole, as in any other case in
which a legal transaction is embodied in more than one instrument.
The terms of the incorporated writing are significant in ascertaining
the testamentary disposition and they may be such that the disposition
is ineffective, but they do not defeat the incorporation of that writing.
For example, suppose that the will leaves property to a trustee on the
terms of a specified trust instrument. That instrument provides that
the trustee shall hold the property for such uses as the settlor shall from
time to time direct. The bequest fails but this is not because the incorporation is ineffective. It fails for the reason that the two writings, the
will and the trust instrument, do not dispose of the estate. A court
might explain the decision by saying that a testator cannot "prospectively create for himself a power to dispose of his property by an instrument not duly executed as a will." The explanation £.ts but it is wholly
unrelated to the problem of incorporation; the decision and the explanation would be the same if the language of the incorporated writing had been placed in the body of the '1vill.
This analysis appears in a recent English case, In re Edwards' Wili
Trusts. 32 The case has been cited as one of two recent decisions which
support the position that a revocable or amendable trust cannot be
incorporated. 33 Actually the decision is one of the best authorities
available for the opposite view. The will gave the entire estate to the
trustees of a specified inter vivos trust, "to be held by them upon the
trusts and subject to the powers and provisions therein declared." The
second paragraph of the trust instrument provided that the trust funds
should be held for "such persons or for such purposes as the settlor
32 [1948] Ch. 440.
33 Lauritzen, "Can

583 (1950).
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shall by any memorandum under his hand direct and in default of such
direction upon trust to pay or transfer the same or any part thereof to
such person and for such purposes as the managing trustee shall in his
absolute and uncontrolled discretion think :fit." The third paragraph
provided that "subject to the provisions of the preceding clause the
trust fund and the income thereof shall be held upon trust" for speci:6ed beneficiaries. After the will was made the testator prepared a
memorandum which was intended to direct disposition under the :first
part of the second paragraph. The lower court held: 34 (1) The memorandum was not validly incorporated since it was written after the will
was executed. More broadly, the court observed that the purported
incorporation of the first portion of the second paragraph failed for the
reason that the testator attempted "to reserve power to alter his testamentary dispositions by a future non-testamentary document and he ...
subsequently ... purported to exercise that reserved power." (2) The
power given to the managing trustee was ineffective, being a power in
trust which failed for uncertainty. (3) There was not a valid disposition by reference to the third paragraph of the trust instrument. To
hold otherwise would defeat the testator's intention since he wished the
estate to go as described in the memorandum. On appeal from the
third ruling the decision was reversed and it was held that the estate
passed in accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of the
trust instrument.
Although the first ruling was not before the court of appeal, its
approach to the problem was quite different from that of the lower
court. In its view there was an incorporation of the second paragraph,
but the paragraph was inoperative because it contained no valid dispositive provisions. The Master of the Rolls said: 35
"The settlement here [i.e., the trust instrument] is a document
which can be perfectly well identified, and there is no rule of law
to the contrary. It can accordingly be incorporated as a piece of
writing into the testamentary disposition. Indeed, if the settlement, instead of being a thing having value and force in itself, had
been merely a memorandum previously executed to which, in his
will, he referred, it could perfectly well have been admitted to
probate as a testamentary instrument. The question then would
have arisen, what provisions in this instrument are valid and what
are invalid? ... We have now got therefore to a stage where there
s4 [1947] 2 All E.R. 521.
a5 [1948] Ch. 440 at 446-47.
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is a will, part of the directions of which cannot operate ... nor do
I see any reason why the invalidity of a provision contained in this
settlement should be any reason for excluding it from the testamentary directions of the deceased."
The problem then became one of construing the two writings; and it
was concluded that the testator meant the third paragraph of the trust
instrument to be operative, not only upon failure to exercise the powers
of the second paragraph but also upon invalidity of any attempted
exercise.
This is a decision that an amendable trust may be incorporated.
The substance of the bequest is the same as that in the Atwood case.
In each case testator's purpose was that the estate should go in accordance with the dispositive provisions of the incorporated instrument
unless he exercised a reserved power to direct a different disposition.
The case also is significant on a problem hereafter to be considered,
that is, the effect of later amendments; but for the moment we are concerned with the effect of the fact that a power to amend was reserved.
Unlike the trial court and the court in the Atwood case, the Master of
the Rolls avoided the pitfalls involved in the statement that "a testator
cannot prospectively create for himself a power, etc."
So far the discussion of the Atwood case has centered on the availability of incorporation. In addition, such a bequest should be upheld
on the ground that the trust instrument has independent significance.
This theory is applicable where the trust is not amendable and the independent significance of the writing is no way lessened by the fact that
the terms of the writing were subject to change.
After the decisions in the Atwood and Boal cases the Rhode Island
Supreme Court accomplished a tour de force. It turned out that the
trust instrument involved in those two decisions had been executed
with formalities sufficient to satisfy the statute of wills. It was accordingly admitted to probate as a part of testator's will.36 There was no
need any longer· for resort to incorporation by reference or the independent significance theory. The federal decisions were not controlling, for the federal courts have no jurisdiction over the
probate of wills.37 In answer to the argument that the testator had
36 Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274, 132 A. 721 (1926); Merrill v. Atwood, 48 R.I. 72, 135
A. 402 (1926).
37 In Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, (2d Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 454, it was
recognized that the state court decision was controlling. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit followed suit in Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 34 F. (2d) 18 (1929).
The jurisdictional aspects are discussed in a note, 43 HARv. L. REv. 462 (1930).
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attempted to reserve the power to change his will without complying
with the necessary formalities, the court observed: "is it of any importance what his ideas were as to an effective method of modifying
either of these instruments so as to change the disposition of the residuary property?"38 That is, the ineffectual attempt to reserve a power to
amend in the will proper did not invalidate the dispositions made by
the will. It is difficult to see why it need have a more destructive effect
when made in another writing which could otherwise be used to :611
out the testamentary provisions.
Apart from the opinions of able writers39 the authority supporting
the Atwood type of bequest is not impressive. Some decisions which
have been cited as authority actually go off on other grounds. It is
always necessary to make this initial inquiry: does the will express the
purpose of leaving the property solely according to the original dispositive terms of the trust instrument, or is it intended to include subsequent amendments? If the :first construction is adopted the bequest
should be effective to the same extent as though the trust were not
amendable. This was the principal basis of decision in Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Cleveland,40 where a residuary bequest to the trustee of
an amendable inter vivas trust was construed to be "upon the trusts
originally defined."
A bequest of the Atwood type is dearly valid in Ohio where the
result is explained in terms of incorporation by reference. 41 Some
reliance has been placed in the Ohio decisions on a statute which authorizes incorporation by reference. But the portion of the statute
which is relevant to the present problem is derived from the judge-made
rules of incorporation so that the legal setting of the problem is essentially the same in Ohio as in any other jurisdiction.42 California has
R.I. 274 at 285.
See the articles by Evans and Scott cited in note l; also 1 Scon, TRUSTS §54.3
(1939).
40 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935). This is a narrow reading of an opinion
which could be and by some writers has been read in broader terms. Shattuck, for example,
apparently is confident that, even though the will is construed to include later amendments,
the bequest is good under the Cleveland decision "at least in relation to the trust as it
stood at the ·time of execution of the will." SHATTUCK, EsTATB PLANNERS' HANDBOOK 88
(1948).
41 Bolles v. Toledo Tr. Co., 144 Ohio 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944); Koeninger v.
Toledo Tr. Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 3 Ohio Op. 345, 197 N.E. 419 (1934); Shawan v.
Farmers Tr. Co., 6 Ohio Op. 309 (1936); Fifth-Third Union Tr. Co. v. Wilensky, 79
Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E. (2d) 920 (1946); First-Central Tr. Co. v. ClaB.in, (Ohio C.P.
1947) 73 N.E. (2d) 388.
42 Ohio Gen. Code (Page 1938) §10504-4. The extrinsic writing must be "referred
to as being actually in existence." The Ohio decisions regard the reference to the trust
instrument as a reference to an existing writing even though the terms of the writing are
subject to amendment.
38 47
39
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upheld incorporation of an amendable trust but the value of the decision is limited by the fact that there was no discussion of the issue
raised by the reservation of a power to amend.43 The same is true of a
New Jersey decision, in which a bequest to the trustee of a revocable
trust was given effect.44 In New York the question must be considered
still open. In Matter of Rausch45 the Court of Appeals sustained a
bequest to the trustee of a previously created inter vivos trust, with no
reference to whether the trust was amendable unless Judge Cardozo
was speaking to this point when he said that the trust instrument "is
as impersonal and enduring as the inscription on a monument." Some
lower court judges in that state have relied upon the Rausch decision
to uphold disposition pursuant to an amendable trust. 46 Others have
pointed out that the trust there involved was neither amendable nor
revocable and have limited the decision accordingly. 47 In President
and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 48 the most important
decision in New York since the Rausch case, there is language which
gives considerable support to the Atwood view; however, the major
emphasis was placed upon the fact that the trust was amended after the
will and the case will be discussed in that connection.
Outside of Ohio the main support for the validity of a bequest of
the type under discussion comes from In re York's Estate,4 9 a recent
New Hampshire case. The decedent established an amendable inter
vivos trust which he amended several times before execution of a
codicil to his will. The codicil bequeathed the residue of his estate to
the ''Trustees under a Living Trust Deed dated March 17, 1938, and
amended [here followed a recital of the dates of amendments], under
which I am the Donor, to be added by said Trustees to the trust estate
held by them under said Living Trust Deed, as amended as aforesaid,
for the benefit of the beneficiaries therein set forth, and thereupon the
same shall become subject to the terms of said Living Trust Deed as so
43 Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 P. 471 (1900).
Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 A. 279 (1928).
45258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
46 In re Bremer's Will, 156 Misc. 160, 281 N.Y.S. 264 (Surrogates Court, 1935);
Est. of Tower, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1946, p. 1889, col. 7 (Surrogates Court).
47President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21
N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1940). I do not know the basis for the assertion in this case that the
trust involved in the Rausch case was neither amendable nor revocable. The reported opin·
ions in the Rausch ~e do not disclose the fact, either in Surrogates Court (143 Misc. 101,
257 N.Y.S. 78), the Appellate Division (234 App. Div. 626, 252 N.Y.S. 129), or the
Court of Appeals (258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755). See also Tilhnans Est., 53 N.Y.S. (2d)
664 (Surrogates Court, 1945).
48 Supra note 47.
49 95 N.H. 435, 65 A. (2d) 282 (1949).
44
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amended." No amendments of the trust deed were made after execution of the codicil. The court upheld the bequest, saying:
"Disposition by addition to a previously created trust, even
though the trust be subject to modification, is clearly valid in relation to the trust in the form which it took at the time of execution
of the will."
This appears to state the broad position that the presence of a power
to amend is irrelevant at least so long as no amendments have been
made after execution of the will. But the principal authority cited for
the statement was Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland,50 in which, as
has been seen, the decision was placed primarily on the narrower
ground that the will was not meant to include later amendments. Moreover, this is also the fair interpretation of the will in York's Estate. The
emphasis on specific amendments probably should be read to mean
that reference was made only to the trust deed as theretofore amended.
The California decision, like the decisions from Ohio, relied upon
incorporation by reference. The New Jersey case left open the question
whether incorporation was recognized in that state and upheld the bequest either on the ground that the inter vivas trust had independent
significance or on the related if not inseparable theory sugg~ted by
Cardozo in Matter of Rausch that this is a simple bequest to a trustee
as a separate entity. In the words of the New Jersey court "the trusteelegatee is as distinct and definite an entity as would have been an individual or corporation legatee."111 In Y ark's Estate the New Hampshire
court concluded that the bequest could be upheld either as an incorporation by reference or on the view that "the inter vivas trust is a fact
'having significance apart from the disposition of the property bequeathed,' which may be relied upon to control such disposition without
violation of the Statute of Wills."52 The reason for the court's final
selection of the latter ground is interesting. If viewed as an incorporation by reference the court thought it might be necessary to set up a
separate testamentary trust subject to the statutes relating to such trusts.
Under the theory adopted it was decided that the testamentary property
was simply added to the corpus of the inter vivos trust; there was no
need for a separate trust or for the application of statutory provisions
relating to testamentary trusts. 5 3
50 291
51 102

Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
N.J. Eq. 294 at 297.
112 95 N.H. 435 at 436.
53 In Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195 at 217, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944), it
was held that use of the incorporation theory did not require the establishment of a separate
trust. See 1 ScO'IT, TnusTs 293 (1939).
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Intent to Include Later Amendments. Reference has been made to
the importance of determining whether the bequest was meant to include amendments made after execution of the will. The problem
of the Atwood case arises only if the will is given this meaning. In
the Atwood case this construction was adopted without discussion and
a recent article on the subject asserts that such construction is "inescapable."54 The problem is not this simple. As already noted, in the
Cleveland case65 the Massachusetts court held that the testator intended
the original terms of the trust to be controlling. The case is of little
value on the interpretation problem since the report does not contain
the actual language of the will; however, it may show an inclination to
construe the will so as to uphold the bequest.56 In Yorli's Estate57 the
language of the will is quoted and on fair reading should be said to
exclude subsequent amendments. It described the original trust instrument and the various amendments already made thereto and directed
disposition in accordance with the trust instrument "as amended as
af oresa1·d,,
.
But the typical situation involves language comparable to that
in the Atwood case, where the trustee was directed to hold the property bequeathed "in the same· manner as though [the property]
had been deposited by me as a part of said trust estate."58 Certainly
this language does not lead inescapably to either conclusion. There
is no way to be sure whether the testator meant the property to go in
accordance with the present or the future dispositive terms of the trust.
There is some suggestion that he meant .to include later amendments;
more it seems than in the case of a bequest to the trustee "for the uses
and purposes set forth and declared in that certain deed of trust...."59
But neither interpretation would be unreasonable and in such case
resort must be had to any useful general ideas. One such idea derives
from a fact that is more or less peculiar to wills, the fact that the
instrument is executed at one time but is to be operative to dispose of
the estate at a later time. The testator has made a bequest to a "trust"
54 Lauritzen, "Can a Revocable Tnist be Incorporated by Reference?" 45 ILL. L. REv.
583 at 594, note 63 (1950). But in Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274 at 285, 132 A. 721
(1926), where the state court sustained the bequest after the federal court decision in the
Atwood case (supra note 36), the court expressed serious doubt on the issue.
55 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
56 Such preference appears in Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925).
57 95 N.H. 435, 65 A. (2d) 282 (1949).
58 The court's conclusion that this covered subsequent amendments is supported by the
Janowitz case (supra note 47) in which the same meaning was given to similar language.
However, the issue of interpretation was not noticed, and this is typical of the decisions.
59The quotation is from Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1 at 5, 60 P. 471 (1900).
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which he has created and can shape until his death; it seems likely that
he thinks of the bequest as one to the creature he leaves at his death.
In doubtful cases, and this includes most cases, the more reasonable
conclusion is that subsquent amendments were to be included.

C. Effect of Subsequent Amendment or Revocation
The specific problem of interpretation that was just considered in
the preceding section opens up larger issues of interpretation. It will
be helpful, I believe, to make a short excursion into these larger issues,
for they have an important bearing on the questions now to be discussed. The interpretation of a will is a complex process because of the
circumstance that it does not become operative to dispose of property
at the time of execution. Despite the fact that its primary effect occurs
at death, the writing takes on legal significance at the time of execution
-it is not simply a piece of paper with words on it. In many jurisdictions it operates forthwith to revoke a prior will. 60 In most of those
jurisdictions the dispositive provisions themselves may have this immediate effect; that is, to revoke a prior will because of inconsistency of
the dispositions where there is no express revocation clause. 61 Even
though a will does not revoke a prior will during testator's lifetime, it
nonetheless is a legal document which has meaning when executed.
This is implicit in the statutory provision that it may be revoked only
in certain ways.
Wigmore pointed out that the meaning of a will may be sought
in a "usage or habit of the testator," but it is suggested he was mistaken
in asserting that "the time of the usage must be the time of the will's
final sanction," that is, at death. 62 In one sense, and a quite fundamental sense, the meaning is determined as of the time of execution.
At the same time it may also be determined by relating the words to the
extrinsic facts existing at death. Where this is done it is because the
meaning of the words at the time they were written was that this should
be done.
A bequest to "my son Jack" refers presumably to a person then living
and identified in the mind of the testator as the legatee. The individual
who fits the description will be ascertained primarily by reference to
601 PAGE, WILLS 865 (1941).
61 The cases which distinguish between express revocation and revocation by inconsistency are the subject of a note at 28 Ky. L.J. 227 (1940). The distinction is made in
Michigan. Cheever v. North, 106 Mich. 390, 64 N.W. 455 (1895); Danley v. Jefferson,
150 Mich. 590, 114 N.W. 470 (1908).
62 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 223 (1940).
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facts existing when the will was made. It might appear that testator
did not then have and never had a son named Jack; but if it were
shown that his habit when he wrote the will was to call his son Richard
by that name the meaning would be clear and Richard would take the
legacy.63 If after the will was written another son was born and given
the name Jack would the legacy go to him? Surely not; the meaning
of the will is here determined in the light of the circumstances at the
time of execution.64 Contrary to Wigmore it is in the situations involving individual usage of the testator that circumstances at the time of
execution are most likely to be controlling.
In some instances the language of the will specifies the time of
reference; for example a bequest to "the persons in my employ at my
63 In Powell v. Biddle, 2 Dall. (Pa.) 70 (1790) a bequest to "Samuel Pawell (son of
Samuel Pawell . ••)" was given to William the son of Samuel on evidence that the testator
"usually, by mistake, or by way of nickname, called him Samuel." An interesting feature
of the case is that Samuel Powell actually had a son named Samuel. But William was the
child of testator's deceased daughter, whereas Samuel the son was the child of a second
wife of Samuel the father, unrelated to the testator. This is an early instance of refusal
to follow the plain meaning rule, a rule discussed in 9 WmMORE, EVIDENCE §§2461-63.
Another interesting example of misnomer appears in Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1,
195
590 (1917).
64 Certainly the books are full of statements that the meaning of a will is to be
gathered "from the circumstances which surrounded the testator when the will was made."
Fritsche v. Fritsche, Executrix, 75 Conn. 285 at 287, 53 A. 585 (1902); 2 PAGE, WILLS
§920 (1941). In the situation described in the text it would be possible to hold that, since
the will stands at the moment of death as the expression of testator's wishes, it should be
read in the light of the circumstances at that time-though such approach would upset the
accepted analysis of many problems in the field of wills. Testator might at death have
intended the bequest to go to the son whose name was Jack. He clearly meant another son
when the will was written and his later formed intent would, I believe, have no legal
significance. The only case cited by Wigmore to support his statement quoted above in
the text is Castle v. Fox, L.R. 11 Eq. 542 (1871). Testator devised his "mansion and
estate called Cleeve Court"; after the will was written he acquired additional lands which
he thought of as a part of his "Cleeve Court estate"; on the basis of this evidence it was
held that all such lands passed under the devise. It would be possible to say that this
corresponded with the meaning of the will when it was executed, that the description was
sufficiently general to suggest that testator meant to devise the land comprising that particular part of his estate at his death-in short that it was not a devise of specific land owned
when the will was made, as though the land had been described by metes and bounds.
But the court did not ,purport to rest the decision on this construction; it tried to apply
literally section 24 of the Wills Act of 1837 (7 Wm. IV & I Viet. c. 26) which provided
that "every Will shall be construed, with reference to the Real Estate and Personal Estate
comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before
the Death of the Testator, unless a contrary Intention shall appear by the Will." Perhaps
one purpose of this section was to eliminate the common law rule that a will could not
dispose of after-acquired land, although this was sufficiently done by section 3 of the
same act; in any event the language goes beyond this purpose. This section of the English
act has been copied in only a few American jurisdictions [Bordwell, "The Statute Law of
Wills," 14 lowA L. REv. 172 at 187 (1929)] and in those jurisdictions the courts probably would not apply it as the English court did [2 PAGE, WILLS 897 (1941)]. In fact it
is doubtful that the decision is of much significance in England in view of In re Evans,
[1909] 1 Ch. 784.
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death." Often the time of reference is not explicit in the language but
is assumed to be the death of the testator because of the inB.uence of the
fact that this is when the will becomes operative. Thus a bequest
of "the residue of my estate" is read to mean all of the property owned
at death which is not otherwise disposed of by the will-a meaning
which is reinforced by the modern rule that a will may dispose of all
property acquired after its execution and owned at death. A bequest to
"my children" is taken to mean those children living at testator's death,
including children born after the will was made.66 In all these instances, however, we relate the words of the will to the extrinsic facts
at death because we construe the will as calling for such reference
from the time of its execution. 66 This is the explanation of the holdings
that when there has been a revocation of a specific or general pecuniary
bequest by striking out the clause, the property or sum of money covered
by such bequest falls into the residue. The argument against this result
has been that it gives dispositive effect to the act of striking and that
while the statute of wills may permit revocation by act on the document
it does not authorize disposition in this fashion. The argument has
usually been rejected on the ground that the property is disposed of by
the residuary clause, not by the act of striking: the meaning of the
residuary clause when written was that it covered all estate owned at
death which was not otherwise effectively bequeathed. 67 In short, this
meaning is determined as of the time of execution but the meaning is
that the language operates in relation to estate owned at death.

Subsequent Amendments. We have considered the effect of the
fact that the trust was amendable, but on the assumption that it had
not been amended after execution of the will. There remains the
problem of the effect of later amendments. The problem is not important of course if the mere fact that the trust was amendable defeats the
attempted bequest. Nor is there a serious issue if the court construes
the will as making disposition by the original trust terms alone. The
65 Casner, "Class Gifts to Others than to 'Heirs' or 'Next of Kin'-Increase in Class
Membership," 51 HA.nv. L. REv. 254 at 268 (1937).
66"As a rule, a general description of persons, or of property, shows that testator
intends the persons or property as they exist at his death. A specific description of persons
or of property so as to distinguish them from other persons or property as they exist when
the will is made, usually shows that testator makes his will with reference to the persons,
property, and the like, as they exist at the time that the will is made." 2 PAGE, WILLS
896-97 (1941).
67 Bigelow v. Gillett, 123 Mass. 102 (1877); ATKINSON, WILLS 378 (1937). Contra:
Miles' Appeal, 68 Conn. 237, 36 A. 39 (1896). Page concludes that the majority rule is
opposed to the position taken in the text but of the five cases cited to support his conclusion
only Miles' Appeal does so. 1 PAGE, W1LLS 793-94 (1941).
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b~quest will be valid in any state which recognizes disposition by the
terms of an unamendable trust, and the amendment will have no effect
on willed property.68 Another subsidiary problem arises where an
amendment has been made after the will, but thereafter a codicil is
executed and there is no amendment after the date of the codicil.
Since the will speaks from the date of the codicil the problem now
under discussion does not arise. 69
In considering the effect of later amendments, one basic distinction
should be made. In some cases it is possible to give complete effect to
the amendment by treating it as applicable only to the corpus of the
inter vivos trust. In other cases the amendment can be given complete
effect only by relating it to property passing at death. Both of these
situations were presented in Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co.70 The
decedent placed $15,000 in an amendable living trust under which the
income was to be paid to himself for life, then to his widow for life,
and upon the death of the survivor the principal was to go to his
daughter. Two days later he executed a will leaving the residue of
his estate to the trustee of the inter vivos trust to be "disposed of in
accordance with the terms and provisions" of such trust. Nine days
later he amended the trust instrument by directing the payment of
$500 to one nephew and the transfer of certain land to another nephew.
The court upheld the residuary bequest and the $500 gift, but held
that the other amendment was invalid. The land which decedent
attempted to dispose of by amendment of the trust was not a part of
the corpus of the trust but was a part of the estate owned at death. In
order to give effect to this amendment, therefore, it seemed necessary
to hold that it was a valid testamentary disposition despite the fact that
it was not executed with the formalities required by the statute of wills.
This the court conceived was not permissible under the statute. The
$500 gift, however, was treated as a valid amendment of the inter vivos
trust, payable out of the corpus of that trust.
. The court's decision with respect to the $500 gift is eminently
sensible. Under the language of the writings the money could be paid
either out of the trust corpus or of estate owned at death. If there is
even a slight predisposition to give effect to a man's attempted settlement of his property, as surely there should be, it is a simple matter to
t1s Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
69This was the situation in York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A. (2d) 282 (1949) and
First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, (Ohio C.P. 1947) 73 N.E. (2d) 388, the bequest being
sustained in each case.
1049 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).

1951]

TESTAMENTARY Annrr10Ns To

A

TRUST CoRPus

53

support the $500 gift by treating it as an amendment of the trust terms
as they related to property placed in trust during the decedent's lifetime.
Money gifts by trust amendment were treated in similar fashion in
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cle11eland. 11 As the trust was written when
the will was executed cash amounts were to be paid on the death of the
settler to thirty-seven beneficiaries. The settler's will bequeathed the
residue of his estate to the trustee of the inter vivos trust. After execution of the will the settlor amended the trust by increasing the amounts
payable to some of the thirty-seven cash beneficiaries and by adding
fifteen additional cash beneficiaries. The amendment also eliminated
an income beneficiary who had died and substituted Emma Frye.
As we have seen, the court upheld the will but construed it as
intended to give the residue to those named in the original trust instrument. This eliminated Emma Frye, but it did not affect the cash gifts
which had been added by amendment. These gifts had become payable under the terms of the trust and the court observed that the "trustee has paid out of the original trust estate all the amounts specified."
No issue was raised on appeal as to the propriety of the trustee's action
but the Massachusetts court did seem to regard it as the obvious thing
to do, which it was. 72 It can be said with considerable assurance, though
on slight authority, that in any jurisdiction which will sustain a bequest
to the· trustee of an amendable trust a later amendment of the trust
which can be satisfied out of trust assets will be effective and will not
affect the validity of the bequest.
This leaves the problem raised by the other amendment in the
Koeninger case which could operate only in relation to estate owned at
death. A closely related problem arose in President and Directors of
Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 73 where the relevant part of the trust instrument gave a portion of the trust estate in specified proportions to
named beneficiaries. The settler's will attempted to dispose of most of
his estate to the trustee of this trust. The trust instrument was
amended four times and the last amendment, which clearly was
made after execution of the will, changed one of the beneficiaries
described above. In each case three principal choices were presented:
(I) to uphold the bequest on the terms of the trust as amended; (2) to
uphold the bequest on the terms of the trust as they appeared when
71291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
72 A similar situation was presented in the Atwood case and again it was disposed of
by action of the trustee without litigation. This appears in the opinion of the· District
Judge, 264 F. 360 at 361 (1920).
78 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1940).
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the will was executed; or (3) to invalidate the entire bequest. Brie8.y,
at this time, it is suggested that the :first choice should be made in the
Janowitz situation, the second in the Koeninger situation. The subsequent amendment in the Janowitz case had independent signi:£.cance,
whereas that in the Koeninger case had not.
In the Janowitz situation it is Professor Scott's view that the later
amendment should be given effect; but if it is not then the third solution, complete invalidity, is preferable to the second because the testator's
purpose would be defeated if the property were to pass under the original
trusts terms. 74 Since there is considerable doubt that later amendments
will be recognized in any circumstances, the practical effect of Scott's view
may be to wholly invalidate the bequest. This is what occurred in the Janowitz case. The court rejected Scott's primary position but adopted his secondary position; since the testator wanted his estate to go as described
in the original trust deed and the four amendments, his intention
would be "frustrated" if it were permitted to go under the original trust
as thrice amended. This reasoning will be examined later but it is
appropriate to observe now that the testator's intent was frustrated anyway under the court's decision.
What possibility is there in either the Janowitz or Koeninger situations of making the first of the three choices described above, that is,
of giving effect to the testator's will exactly as he wished by upholding
the disposition in accordance with the trust as amended? No· case
known to the writer has done so. Incorporation by reference is not
available since the amendment was made after execution of the will,
but can the amendment properly be regarded as a fact of independent
significance? This idea has been used to uphold bequests which are
given meaning by reference to an act of the testator occurring after
execution of the will. Examples already have been given, such as the
bequest to persons in the testator's employ at his death. A more extreme
instance is the bequest of the "contents of my safe deposit box," a type
of bequest which commonly is upheld even though it is construed as
referring to the contents at death. When such a bequest, which is
effective in New York, 75 is compared with the Janowitz case, it is apparent that the courts have not yet achieved a rational organization of the
different parts of the total problem. The bequest in the safe deposit box
74 J ScO'rl', TRUSTS 299 (1939). Scott discusses the Janowitz decision in ''The Law
of Trusts 1941-1945," 59 HARV. L. REv. 157 at 167 (1945).
7 5 Matter of Thompson, 217 N.Y. 111, 111 N.E. 762 (1916); In re Le Collen's Will,
190 Misc. 272, 72 N.Y.S. (2d) 467 (1947). Other cases are cited in ATKINSON, W1LLS
341 (1937).
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case is effected by a later act of the testator which certainly has no more
and probably has much less independent meaning than the amendatory
act in the Janowitz case.
The refusal to give effect to later amendments seems to be the result
of a failure to divorce this method of analysis completely from incorporation by reference. In incorporation a sharp distinction is drawn between writings prepared before and after execution of the will. There
is a tendency to carry this distinction over into a mode of analysis where
it has no place. The time of preparation of the extrinsic writing has
very little to do with its independent signi£cance.76 When this analysis
is applicable there is nothing that compels a court to resort to ideas of
incorporation. Incorporation applies without regard to whether the
extrinsic writing has independent meaning. The latter concept applies
without regard to whether the rules of incorporation are met. Confusion may have resulted from the functional relationship between the
two, particularly the fact that in many situations a bequest can be upheld on either theory.
The nearest analogy to the present problem is the group of cases
giving effect to a will which leaves property in accordance with the
terms of the will of another who was then living but who predeceased
the testator. The classic case is Matter of Fowles77 in which testator's
will gave a part of his estate to trustees "pursuant to the provisions of
such last will and testament as my said wife may leave (hereby conferring upon my said wife -the power to dispose of the said one-half by
last will and testament duly executed by her)." The will also provided
that, in case husband and wife died under such circumstances that it
could not be determined who survived, "it shall be deemed that I shall
have predeceased my said wife." Had the husband died fast, there
would have been no serious question as to the effectiveness of the
bequest since it could be sustained as a general testamentary power of
76 This is not to say that there is no possible connection between the time of preparation of the extrinsic writing and the independent significance doctrine. If the writing was
prepared before the will the testator probably did not then have in mind its use in connection with his will; if prepared after the will, the probability is the other way. But the
use of extrinsic facts of independent significance is not precluded because the facts may
have been molded by the testator with testamentary disposition as one of his objectives. If
this were true, the theory could not be used where the trust was created in connection
with the execution of the will, and even in cases where it was created earlier it would be
open to inquiry as to whether at that time the testator planned to later bequeath property
to the trustee. In states such as New York which purport to reject incorporation, the possibility of leaving property to a trustee would be surrounded with limitations which no one
has suggested.
77 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
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appointment vested in the wife. But husband and wife went down
with the Lusitania and there was no evidence concerning who was the
survivor, nor was the situation aided in New York by any presumption.
With the legatee unable to discharge the burden of proving that the
wife outlived the testator, the decision must in effect rest on the assumption that she had not. The attempted bequest of a power to the wife
lapsed; yet it was clear that in such circumstances the testator wished
his property to go on the trusts described in his wife's will. The reference to the wife's "last will" may not have satisfied the formalities of
incorporation,78 and in any event New York decisions had rejected
that doctrine. The ·court of Appeals upheld the bequest. There
was no emphasis on the wife's will being in existence when the
husband's will was executed, if indeed it was, and it is clear that the
result would have been the same even though her will had been prepared some time later. 79 The decision does not rest on incorporation,
at least as it has been traditionally defined.
Commentators have disagreed on the theory of the decision. Actually it is possible to use more than one theory. The decision can be
supported on the ground that the extrinsic language used to give meaning to the husband's will had independent significance in that it also
operated to dispose of the wife's estate. 80 Some writers have rejected
this explanation, apparently because under the husband's will it was
78According to the opinion, the wills were "made at the same time," which presumably
means as a part of the same transaction. This should satisfy the existence in fact requirement though the matter is not free of doubt if the wife's will was executed after the
husband's. See 3 A.L.R. (2d) 682 at 688-89 (1949). The chief obstacle to the iipplication of incorporation is that the language of the husband's will may not have sufficiently
expressed the purpose of incorporating a particular instrument therein described. "He has
not limited his wife,'' the court said, "to any particular will." 222 N.Y. at 233. However,
in Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925), a bequest to the trustees
"under my said husband's will" was held to incorporate a previously executed will of the
husband. Cf. Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910).
79 In addition to the court's statement that the testator ''has not limited his wife to
any particular will" is the fact that the court relied squarely on Matter of Piffard, 111 N .Y.
410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888)-"Piffard's case cannot be distinguished." 222 N.Y. at 232. In
that case the will gave a share of the estate to a daughter, with a provision added by codicil
that if the daughter predeceased the testator, the share should go "to the executors or
trustees" named in her will. The daughter died before the testator and the bequest to her
executors was sustained as a bequest to the legatees named in her will. The court said
that testator intended to bequeath the share "to such person or persons and in such shares
and proportions as by an existing will, made before or after the date of the codicil, she
had determined and directed or should determine and direct in the disposition of her own
property••••" 111 N.Y. at 414 (emphasis added).
BOEvans, "Incorporation by Reference, Integration and Non-Testamentary Act,'' 25
CoL. L. RBv. 879 at 899 (1925); Evans, ''Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by
Reference," 16 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 635 at 638-40 (1949); PoWEu., REPoRT OF LAw
RBvxs10N CoMMISSION, STATE OF NEW YoRK 431 at 444 (1935).
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possible for the wife to name the beneficiaries by a provision in her will
which had no other purpose. 81 If in fact she had done so the argument·
would have undeniable force. In fact she did not; the residuary clause
of her will created a trust to cover her own residuary estate as well as
that passing to her trustee under the husband's will. The argument is
reduced to the assertion that extrinsic facts which do have independent
meaning may not be used if under the language of the testator's will
those facts could have been molded otherwise. The decisions do not
support the assertion and it is at war with the basic theory.82 What the
courts have been interested in is whether in fact the extrinsic circumstances serve another purpose. In essentials, Matter of Fowles does not
differ from the cases which support a bequest to the "executors"83 or
81 S'cott, "Trusts and the Statute of Wills," 43 HARV. L. REv. 521 at 552, note 85
(1930); 1 Scorr, TnusTs 303 (1939); comment, 46 Mien. L. REv. 77 at 83 (1947).
Scott argues ( 43 HARv. L. REv., as cited above) that "since the testator did not provide that
his property should be disposed of as his wife should dispose of her property but that it
should be disposed of as she should appoint, the decision cannot be upheld on this ground
[i.e., independent significance]." Actually, the testator's property did not pass pursuant to
a power of appointment, nor did the will as construed by the court provide that it should
in the circumstances which occurred. The power lapsed because the wife was not shown
to have outlived the husband, and the court construed the husband's will as providing for
a substituted gift to those named in the wife's will to take this part of the husband's estate.
Judge Cardozo pointed out that "The question is not whether this power of appointment
lapsed. The question is whether the testator has avoided the consequences of a lapse. More
concretely, it is whether the law permits him to provide that if the donee's survivorship is
incapable of proof, he will give his estate none the less to whomever she has named." 222
N.Y. at 230. Scott's statement goes on the assumption that the testator's will must show
that the reference is to facts which necessarily will have independent significance. An
underlying issue is whether it is necessary that the validity of the bequest be capable of
final determination when the will is executed. It seems clear that this is not required. Thus
if the bequest had been held ineffective in the Fowles case it nonetheless would have been
good had the wife outlived the husband.
The question whether a will provides for a substituted gift in the event a power
lapses may be a close one. In Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910), the
will gave property "as my said wife shall in and by her last Will and Testament devise and
bequeath the same." The wife having died before the husband, it was held that the
power lapsed and the attempted disposition therefore failed. The will could reasonably
have been construed, however, as disposing of the property to those named by the wife
whether she died before or after the testator. This argument was advanced by counsel; but
it was tied to the theory of incorporation by reference which the court rejected because
there was no reference to the "particular will" of the wife which was in existence when
testator's will was executed.
82 In Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen 255, 48 Eng. Rep. 626 (1837), affd. 3 My. & Cr.
507, 40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1838), there was a bequest "unto and amongst my partners, who
shall be in co-partnership with me lit the time of my decease, or to whom I may have
disposed of my said business.••." Testatrix disposed of her business during lifetime and
the bequest was held effective to give the property to the "disponees." Undoubtedly the
bequest also would have been effective as to the partners, had testatrix not disposed of the
business; but the matter seems irrelevant since in the circumstances that occurred the will
is given meaning by relating the language to facts which do have independent significance.
83 Matter of Piffard, lll N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
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"estate"84 of another person who was living when the will was made
but predeceased the testator. The testator's property has been held in
such cases to pass to the legatees named in the other person's will.85
In Condit v. DeHart,86 however, the facts apparently presented the
nicer issue as to the use of a clause in another will which served no
purpose except to designate the testator's legatees. The will made a
bequest "to such person or persons as my said son in his last will and
testament shall name, designate and appoint." The son predeceased the
testator leaving a will in which he designated his wife to receive the
property, evidently in a clause which had no other purpose. The bequest was upheld with the statement that the son's will could be
"referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the person to whom that
estate passes by the father's will." After the son's death the father
had executed a codicil which "ratified and confirmed" the will. Perhaps
incorporation is a sufficient explanation; since the father's will spoke
from the date of the codicil, there was then no possibility of a later will
of the son and the instrument to be incorporated therefore was necessarily the existing will of the son. However, there is little in the opinion
to suggest that the court was thinking in these terms.
At this point the search for a theory becomes harder. The Fowles
decision can be explained by the fact that the paragraph of the wife's
will which identified the husband's legatees served the independent
purpose of naming her own. It is highly questionable whether this idea
would be extended to permit use of the extrinsic document simply because in another distinct part it served such a purpose. What remains
is the fact that the extrinsic writing was itself a validly executed will.
The objective of the statutory formalities is to give some assurance that
the testator's real wishes are given effect. When the testator's will contains a provision which in effect empowers another to name his legatees,
it is the writing of that person which then needs to be safeguarded. It
has been, in legal theory, when executed in compliance with the statute
of wills, and this should suffice. On the whole this is perhaps the most
satisfactory explanation of both the Condit and Fowles cases. 87
Nonetheless it is believed that the Fowles case can be treated as a
warranted application of the independent significance concept, not
limited by the fact that the extrinsic writing was a duly executed will.
84Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (1930).
85Jn addition to cases cited in notes 83 and 84, see 3 PAGl!, WILLS §1041 (1941).
86 62 N.J.L. 78, 40 A. 776 (1898). A similar decision is Murchison v. Wallace, 156
Va. 728, 159 S.E. 106 (1932).
87 This is Scott's explanation of the Fowles case. 1 Sco'IT, TnuSTS 3034 (1939).
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It should be possible, that is, to bequeath property to legatees who will
be identified by the subsequent writing of another person if the applicable language of that writing has independent significance. 88 The
central problem is whether this will be applied to a subsequent writing
of the testator himself and more specifically to his later amendment of
his own living trust. The few decisions directly involving the problem
give little basis for belief that this will be done in any circumstances.
There has been some wishful thinking on the subject with resultant
bad advice. Shattuck concludes that disposition pursuant to the terms
of a trust, as amended after execution of the will, "is valid in Massachusetts."89 He does warn that "a dictum contained in the Cleveland
case remains to be corrected...." When it is observed that Old Colony
Trust Co. 11. Cleveland90 is the latest word in Massachusetts, the conclusion becomes dangerously misleading if intended to provide a guide
for the draftsman. But though the decisions up to now give a negative
answer, they are few in number and the question is largely unsettled.
There is still some reason to believe that recognition may be given to
later trust amendments. Cases such as Matter of Fowles provide a
forceful analogy. On the assumption that ground may be given in the
,decisions, it seems useful to consider the probable outer limits.
An important line of cleavage is suggested in the facts of the
Koeninger and Janowitz cases. In the latter the subsequent amendment
attempted to substitute one beneficiary for another. The beneficiary
was to receive on the settlor's death a certain proportion of the trust
corpus, whether it was property placed in trust during lifetime or property which was to go into the trust at death. The amendment was
intended to operate inseparably to designate the beneficiary as to both
parts, and presumably was effective as to the corpus of the inter vivos ·
trust.91 It had independent meaning, as much as the wife's will in
88 This possibility was recognized in Stubbs v. Sargon, supra note 82. To illustrate
the independent significance idea the court put the case of a devise by a father to "such
one of his [two] sons as shall not be the appointee of X," where X had a power to appoint
other property to either of the two sons. The act of X "is to decide who shall take the
father's estate," yet the court had no doubt that the devise would be valid. Nor did it
think the case would be different if the act were that of the testator instead of another
person.
89 SHATrtICK, ESTATB PLANNERS' HANDBOOK 90 (1948).
90 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935). The court said at 382: "Obviously the will
• • • could not give the residue in trust for purposes which had not then been defined, but
remained to be defined by a later amendment of the trust deed."
91 Recognition of the amendment as applied to the corpus of the living trust might
cause an extreme distortion of the testator's plan in some instances-though more basically
the distortion would be caused by the invalidation of the bequest to the trustee. Suppose, for
example, that the trust corpus was valued at $25,000 and the original terms of the trust gave the
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Matter of Fowles, and should have been given effect as to estate owned
at death. On the other hand, the amendment in the Koeninger case
which related to land owned at the testator's death could have no effect
except to designate the donee of such property. If this had been the
whole of the amending instrument, its recognition would unquestionably be inconsistent with the requirements of the statute of wills.
The actual situation in Koeninger was that the amending instrument contained two unrelated amendments, one of which was effective
in relation to the property placed in trust during lifetime. Arguably
this gave the instrument as a whole sufficient independent meaning to
sustain the attempted disposition of the land. However, it is unlikely
that a court would go this far. The same limitation is suggested here
as that discussed in connection with Condit 11. DeHart.92 The decisions generally seem to be limited by the fact that there is independent
meaning in the specific act of the testator or other extrinsic fact which
is sought to be used. Beyond this, such limitation seems advisable. It
is difficult at best to offer an explanation of the independent significance concept which gives much aid in marking the outer limits. In
general, the extrinsic fact should give reasonable assurance that the
decedent's estate is being disposed of in accordance with his wishes.
In these cases an instrument was executed in compliance with the
statute. The additional facts that gave it full meaning normally will
fulfill the objective of the statute if they occurred in the course of
·testator's lifetime affairs. But when the fact consists of an unattested
writing of the testator which is designed in part to produce testamentary
consequences, the statutory requirements are particularly troublesome.
Fair meaning should be given them, and it would seem that fair meaning does not permit the use of a part of an unattested writing which
has as its sole purpose the disposition of property at death.
In any case wherein the court refuses effect to a later amendment the
problem then arises as to the validity of the basic disposition to the
corpus to B on the death of the settlor. The settlor's will left the residue of his estate, worth
$100,000, to the trustee. Thereafter he amended the trust to provide that X should have $20,000 out of the corpus. His purpose was that X should have $20,000 and B $105,000 out of a
corpus consisting of $125,000. Under the Koeninger decision his wishes will be given effect
since the $20,000 to X can be paid out of the corpus of the inter vivos trust. Under the Atwood
decision, the bequest to the trustee is invalid and the corpus consists of only $25,000. If the
amendment is effective in relation to the the inter vivos trust, the consequence is that X receives
$20,000 and B $5,000. If B has any remedy, which is doubtful, it would seem to rest on the
theory of unjust enrichment of X at B's expense because of settlor's mistake in basic assumptions in making the gift to X.
92 Supra

note 86.
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trustee. On this the Koeninger and Janowitz cases are in conllict. It is
believed that the choice of complete invalidity suggested by Scott and
adopted in the Janowitz case is the greater of two evils. Scott's argument, which was quoted with approval in the Janowitz case, is that "it
would defeat the purpose of the testator to have the property pass in
accordance with the original terms of the inter 'llivos instrument." 03 It
is not clear why this leads to the conclusion that the entire bequest fails.
The testator's purpose is going to be defeated in whole or in part in
any event. If the objective is, as it should be, to carry out the intended
bequests as fully as possible within the legal framework, the greater
likelihood is that this will be done by adopting the Koeninger rather
than the Janowitz solution. On the average, changes attempted by
amendment of the trust will be relatively minor, will leave intact, that
is, the main scheme of disposition. Once we are faced with ineffectiveness of a later amendment, surely it is better to make the choice which
will usually be closer to the testator's actual wishes.
Account also must be taken of the method of analysis used. If the
problem is viewed as one of incorporation there is a technical obstacle
to the result of the Janowitz case. As of the time of execution the incorporated language is treated almost as though it were contained in
the body of the will. If in fact it were, the ineffective amendment
would be disregarded and the estate would pass under the original
terms. It is by no means easy to escape the same conclusion
in the case of incorporation, though it is true that the incorporated
writing is not regarded for all purposes as an integral part of the will.
It is significant that the Ohio decisions, including the Koeninger case.,
consistently regard a bequest to the trustee of an inter vivos trust as
presenting a problem of incorporation.
Viewed however in terms of the use of facts having independent
significance this difficulty disappears. The use of the trust instrument
becomes a part of the process of interpretation, and under this more
Hexible approach no legal doctrine stands squarely in the way of
either the Koeninger or Janowitz solution. The choice can be made by
considering which solution will generally come closer to carrying out
the testator's wishes.
The decision in Edward's Will T rusts94 is relevant. The trust
instrument did not use the conventional language of an amendable
931 Sco'IT, TRUSTS 299 (1939). There was no supporting authority when the statement was made. In addition to the Koeninger case, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland,
291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935), lends some support to the opposite view.
94 [1948] Ch. 440.
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trust but that was the substantial effect. Beneficiaries were named to
take the property if the settlor failed .to designate others ''by any memorandum under his hand." Such a memorandum was prepared after
execution of the will but could not be used because it was unattested.
It was held that the estate went to the beneficiaries originally named.
In result the case is like the Koeninger case; an attempted amendment
being ineffective the estate passed in accordance with the original dispositive terms of the trust. This conclusion was rested on a construction of the language of the trust instrument which made provision for
later designation of beneficiaries by the settlor and then recited that
"subject to" such provision the estate should be held for named beneficiaries. The court read this to mean that the named beneficiaries were
to take if for any reason there was no effective designation of others.
It is true that in the ordinary case of reference to an amendable
trust there is less in the language of the will or the trust instrument to
furnish a basis for such an interpretation. Nonetheless this is probably
the way the testator would think about the matter. This is one of those
numerous situations in which the testator did not anticipate the possible
invalidity of any of his attempted dispositions; or if he did, no provision
was made in the instruments to cover the possibility. In such circumstances the law must do the best it can. In an analogous situation
involving the application of dependent relative revocation, courts regularly assume that the testator would have preferred the will he ostensibly revoked to no will at all. For example, when he cancels one will
in connection with the preparation of a later will which is not validly
executed, it is held that there was no revocation. 95 The revocation of
the first will was intended, the courts say, to be conditioned on the
effectiveness of the second. The underlying assumption is that he
would have preferred the first will to intestacy. This assumption and
more particularly its mechanical application by the courts has been the
subject of legitimate attack,96 but there is stronger basis for an analogous
assumption in the Atwood-Koeninger situation. Meaning is colored
by the fact that the testator reserved a power to amend. It is true that
the power is broad enough to permit the substitution of a wholly new
scheme of disposition. In terms of ordinary ways of thinking, however,
95 Strong's Appeal, 79 Conn. 123, 63 A. 1089 (1906). Similarly, where the testator
destroys or cancels a will in the mistaken belief that this will "revive" an earlier will, it has
been held that there was no revocation. Est. of Callahan, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W. (2d)
352 (1947). See generally, Warren, "Dependent Relative Revocation," 33 HARv. L. Rnv.
337 (1920).
96 See Warren's article, supra note 95.
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we are closer to probable intent if it is held, as in Edward's Will Trusts,
that the original terms control where the amendment is ineffective.
The facts of the decided cases bear out this conclusion. In Janowitz the original terms of the trust provided for distribution of onethird of the corpus to designated beneficiaries. The number of beneficiaries does not appear in the reports but it probably was fairly large
since the size of the shares was expressed in thousandths (e.g., the
widow was to receive 109/IO00ths). The only amendment clearly
made after execution of _the will changed one benefiicary. Surely the
testator would have preferred that a share go to the beneficiary he
attempted to eliminate, instead of complete invalidity. In Koeninger,
the original terms gave the widow the income for life with the principal
to be thereafter distributed to a daughter. The ineffective amendment
attempted to give ten acres of land to a nephew, a change which in all
likelihood was a minor alteration of the original plan of disposition
(though the size of the estate does not appear). In the Atwood case the
original trust instrument provided for a large number of beneficiaries
(the opinion states that one group comprised about thirty) and the
only amendment relevant to the present problem canceled a $3,000
gift to one individual.
Of course the ineffective amendments might be so extensive in a
particular case that complete invalidity would be preferable to the
original terms. To put a simple case, the original terms may have made
X the sole beneficiary with the attempt by amendment to substitute Y
as sole beneficiary. Even here it is debatable whether the testator would
have preferred complete invalidity to the original terms. In the situations described in the preceding paragraph it is reasonably certain that
he would have chosen the original terms.
It has been assumed in the decisions and writings on the subject,
and the assumption has been made in the discussion thus far, that the
dispositive terms of the later amendment must be ignored in solving the
problem of construction. If those terms can be taken into account they
provide a guide to intelligent decision and the case can be brought
within familiar ideas. Where a part of a will is invalid courts sometimes must decide whether to confine invalidity to that part or to strike
down a larger scheme of disposition, perhaps the whole will. The following statement illustrates the approach: "The rule for the determination of this question is that the valid provisions will be upheld if they
can be separated from those which are invalid and given effect without
doing violence to the intention of the testator and destroying his scheme
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for the disposition of his property."97 If this approach could be used a
qualitative judgment could be made in each case on whether giving
effect to the original bequest would be an undue distortion of the intended testamentary scheme shown by all the instruments including
the later amendment. The legal objection is that the provisions of an
unattested writing are being used in construing the will, an objection
that does not apply when the invalid provision is in the will. This
approach, for example, is never used in the case of changes in testamentary plan attempted by an invalidly executed codicil or later will.
To hold otherwise would mean for one thing that in result a duly executed will might be revoked by a later instrument not properly
executed.
If the instant situation is analyzed in terms of incorporation it
probably will be assimilated to the case in· which the original dispositive terms of the trust were written into the will. The ineffective
amendment will be ignored. Under the other method of analysis the
will is not regarded as containing by reference the provisions of the
extrinsic writing. The revocation argument becomes inapt-this, it
should be noted, finds support in the Janowitz case. The central question is whether the terms of an unattested writing which under the
decisions will not be given dispositive effect can properly be considered
in deciding if the property should pass under the original trust terms.
In all probability the answer is negative. The legal basis for such use
of the writing despite the statute of wills would be its independent
significance. If a court refuses to find this sufficient for giving dispositive effect to the writing it is likely that it would also refuse to consider
the writing for the other purpose. It seems unfortunate however to
compound the original error, in the name of the statute of wills. 98

Subsequent Revocation. In Fi~h Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky99 the testator gave the residue of his estate to the trustee of a revoc97 Easton v. Hall, 323 lli. 397 at 422, 154 N.E. 216
98 The distinctions become exceedingly fine. Even

(1926).
though dispositive effect is not
given to the writing, its language cannot be wholly ignored. It was not in the Janowitz
case, for only by looking at the language could the court ascertain that it purported to amend
the terms of the trust. The nearest analogy which occurs to the writer is in dependent
relative revocation cases. In the illustration given earlier in the text, involving cancellation
of one will in connection with the ineffective execution of another, it has been assumed
that the provisions of the unattested writing may be considered in deciding whether the
testator would have intended the revocation to be absolute or conditional. The analogy is
not good enough however; as Warren has pointed out, "there is no objection to going fully
into parol evidence to ascertain his attitude, for one is not varying a writing but an act."
''Dependent Relative Revocation," 33 HARv. L. REv. 337 at 345 (1920).
oo 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E. (2d) 920 (1946).
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able inter vivos trust. Thereafter by written instrument he revoked the
trust agreement "in its entirety" without changing his will. The Ohio
court held that the residuary estate passed in accordance with the original terms of the trust. It concluded that the testator intended to revoke
only as to the inter vivos trust.
The framework of the problem is different under the two methods
of analysis. In terms of incorporation it is a problem of revocation and
it is fairly certain that, even though the revoking instrument were construed as an attempt to revoke the bequest, the attempted revocation
would be held inoperative as not coming within the statutory methods
for revoking a will.100 But considered as a problem of interpretation
by reference to extrinsic circumstances the question of revocation is
not presented until another issue is settled. When the will was made
did the testator intend a final and definitive bequest to the designated
beneficiaries; or did he intend the bequest to be inoperative in the
event the trust was revoked; or did the will have a meaning somewhere
between these two? As a matter of orderly analysis, that is, the first
problem concerns the meaning of the will when executed rather than
the meaning of the revoking instrument. Where the trust is amendable we have concluded, though the point is debatable, that the testator
intended a bequest to the trust in the form it took at his death. It does
not follow that a comparable meaning should be given to the revocable
aspect of the trust, for this would be ascribing to him a purpose to make
the residuary bequest inoperative should he thereafter revoke the trust.
If this latter meaning is given to the will, then the revocation of
the trust makes the bequest inoperative without regard to whether that
intent is expressed in the revoking instrument. On the other hand if
the will is read as an attempt to dispose of the estate to the designated
beneficiaries even though the trust is thereafter wholly revoked, it would
seem that ? later attempt to revoke by unattested instrument would be
disregarded. The question of construction of the will is virtually unanswerable. Where the bequest is in the residuary clause, as it commonly is in these situations, the controlling factor usually should be
the constructional preference for avoiding intestacy. With this factor
in mind it seems to me that neither of the above interpretations should
be adopted. Instead, the will should be read as though the testator had
said: "If I hereafter revoke the trust I do not want this to affect the
100 "Patently, an amendment to or revocation of the terms of a trust after it had been
incorporated in the will would, if given effect, be repugnant to the foregoing statute [on
revocation] unless executed as required by our statute pertaining to wills." Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195 at 210, 58 N.E. (2d) 381 (1944).
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residuary bequest unless the revoking instrument so provides." If the
instrument does "revoke" both the inter vivas trust and the bequest it
should be effective, not as a revocation but rather on the theory that
this gives effect to a meaning the will carried from the outset. A
similar effect is achieved under a bequest of the securities in a safe
deposit box where the securities are withdrawn after execution of the
will.
It should be emphasized that this conclusion relates only to a later
revocation of the entire trust. Subsequent amendments eliminating
beneficiaries101 and perhaps substituting others could also be viewed
as involving partial revocation. It is not possible to deal adequately with
the problem of the interaction of later amendments and later revocation
because of the lack of authority and the uncertainties concerning the
effect of later amendments. But if it is once recognized that meaning
may be given to a will by reference to later amendments having independent significance, the solution of most of the problems of "partial
revocation" will result as a by-product. In essence, they will not be
regarded as problems of revocation. One example will suffice.
Assume that a residuary bequest is made to the trustee of an inter
vivos trust which is both amendable and revocable. The trust instrument provides that income is to be paid to the settlor for life and at his
death the corpus is to be turned over to X and Y. After execution of
the will the settlor amends the trust by eliminating X as a beneficiary
and substituting Z. The amendment has independent significance because it changes the beneficial interests in the trust corpus. If the will
is construed as a bequest to the trust in the form it took at death, as
normally it should be, the residue should go to Y and Z. It is not necessary to regard the amendment as a revocation of a bequest to X. In
101 In the Atwood case (supra note 16) the later amendment attempte9- to eliminate
a gift of $3,000 to Amelia. If the primary bequest to the trustee were upheld, what would
be the effect of this amendment? On the theory of incorporation, as applied in the
Koeninger case, it probably would be held ineffective, so that Amelia would take. The
issue is puzzling, however, on the Koeninger analysis, for it will be remembered that that
court gave effect to a later amendment adding a cash beneficiary on the ground that the
sum could be paid out of trust corpus. But since under the terms of the writings the
amount could be paid either out of trust corpus or of estate owned at death, it would seem
the Ohio court would hold that Amelia was given a legacy by the will which could not be
revoked by a later unattested writing. If the full implications of the independent significance theory were accepted and applied, Amelia would not take for the reason that the
disposition to the trustee was on the terms of the trust as they were written at death.
The actual outcome of the litigation in the Atwood case presumably left Amelia with
$3,000. She would have taken nothing had the federal decision stood (supra note 18),
but under the state decision (supra note 36), which probated the trust instrument as a
will, the $3,000 gift to Amelia was a legacy which could not be revoked by the later
amendment unless that amendment also complied with the formalities of the statute of wills.
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a sense it was, but the fundamental meaning of the will from the outset
was that the residue should go to those who were trust beneficiaries at
testator's death.102 To illustrate the point, if a bequest is made to "the
person who is my housekeeper at my death," we would not regard the
will as making a bequest to the present housekeeper which was revoked
when the testator changed housekeepers.

II
From this review of the decisions it should be clear that there are
areas of uncertainty where certainty is desirable and that the solutions
emerging are not satisfactory. One of the undesirable consequences of
the present state of the law is that a slight measure of doubt is cast on
the validity of some bequests to community foundations which use the
trust device to administer for charitable purposes funds given by members of the community.103 Some states have enacted statutes to eliminate this doubt,1° 4 but the need is demonstrated for legislation of
broader scope. The following section is suggested for enactment as a
part of a state's statute of wills:
"A devise or bequest in a duly executed will shall not be invalid for
lack of compliance with sections - - - [the sections pertaining to
102 This may appear inconsistent with the position taken earlier that, in the event the
later amendment is held ineffective, it is preferable to adopt the Koeninger solution and
sustain the bequest on the original trust terms; inconsistent because the assumption is made
that there was a bequest on the original terms of the trust. I think there is no inconsistency.
It is only necessary to recognize that under the independent significance theory the will
may have more than one meaning. Thus, if the issue were whether the will revoked an
earlier will because of inconsistent provisions, the question undoubtedly would be determined by reference to the terms of the trust when the will was executed.
10a Linney v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 30 Ohio App. 345, 165 N.E. 101 (1928) sustained
a bequest to a trust company for the purposes set forth in a resolution of the trust company
providing for a community charitable trust known as the Cleveland Foundation. [The
Cleveland Foundation was the first of the community charitable trusts. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §330 (1935); 3 PRENTICE-HALL TRUST SERVICE §9103]. I do not suggest
that a court should or is likely to invalidate such a bequest in any circumstances, even if it
accepts the Atwood decision. If the bequest is to the trustee on the terms set forth in the
instrument creating the community trust, it should be effective either as an incorporation
by reference or on the independent significance theory. If the testator limits the bequest to
particular charitable purposes, the instrument governing the actions of the trustee and the
Foundation committee provides for a departure from the limitations by action of the committee under standards much like those established by the courts for the exercise of the
cy pres power. 3 PRENTICE-HALL TRUST SERVICE §9131; see also the form in 6 BoGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §1144. This has some of the appearance of a bequest on the terms
of a trust which is amendable by others than the donor, but it is apparent that the power
to depart from the testator's directions has no significance until the will takes effect at
death.
104 Conn. Gen. Stat., 1949, §6884; New York Real Property Law §113 and Personal
Property Law §12.
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the formalities of execution of a will] where it is made in form or in
substance to the trustee of a trust established in writing during the
testator's lifetime; nor shall it be invalid because the trust may be
amended or revoked or both by the settlor or any other person or
persons; nor because the trust was amended after execution of the will.
The devise or bequest may operate to dispose of property on the terms
of the trust as they appear in writing at the testator's death, except, that
any writing prepared after execution of the will which would have the
sole effect of disposing of property at death shall be disregarded."
Some explanation is due as to the meaning of the proposal.
I. A bequest will not be invalid because the tru_st is subject to
amendment or revocation or both.
2. In general later amendments may be given effect. However,
where the only purpose of the amendment is to dispose of estate owned
at death it will not be effective. This goes beyond the limits heretofore
proposed in this paper as to the propriety of recognizing later amendments under existing statutes. If the only amendment contained in the
amending instrument in the Koeninger case had related to the land
owned at death, it would not be recognized under the proposed statute.
It would, however, be recognized in the form that it took in the Koeninger case, being coupled with an amendment of the inter vivas trust.
It is debatable whether this step should be taken, but on the whole it
seems proper. The typical amendment probably is of the sort appearing
in the Janowitz case, operating inseparably on both the trust corpus
and the estate owned at death. The type of amendment used in the
Koeninger case, with either the entire amendment or a separable part
operating only on estate owned at death, presents a relatively minor
problem; and if the instrument has some independent meaning there
is no great danger in giving it complete effect.
Where the amendment relates only to estate owned at death it is to
be disregarded but the principal disposition will be effective. This does
not adopt the approach discussed in connection with the Koeninger
and Janowitz cases, of attempting to determine in the individual case
whether, testator's intent will be more nearly approximated by complete invalidation or by upholding the bequest but ignoring the amendment. That would be a useful approach if no later amendments are to
be recognized, but there is little need for it with the extensive recognition given later amendments under the proposed statute.
3. No position is taken on whether the will should be construed as
disposing of the property in accordance with later amendments. The

1951] TESTAMENTARY AonrrmNs To A TRusT CoRPus

69

question has not been a source of difficulty in the cases, and as a part
of a larger problem of interpretation of wills it seems advisable to leave
it open for judicial decision. Nor is any position taken on the effect of
an entire revocation of the trust. The problem is inherently difficult
but apparently arises infrequently. Where the decedent has taken
such drastic action surely he will usually take care of the testamentary
aspects of the matter by changing his will.
4. The proposed statute applies only where there is a valid trust
during testator's lifetime. It would not apply, for example, if the testator executed an instrument naming a trustee and fully describing the
terms of a trust but placed no property in the trust during his lifetime.
However, the proposal does not displace common law or statutory rules
of incorporation and the bequest would still be effective if those rules
were satisfied.
No attempt is made to place a minimum on the amount of property which must be placed in the trust during lifetime, either absolutely or in relation to the total amount of the settlor's estate. This
will make it possible for a man to create a trust with a relatively small
corpus, leave property by will to the trustee, and then in effect change
the terms of the will by amendment of the trust. Occasional decisions
indicate that such a device has been attempted.105 No case known to
the writer has passed on the point but it has been suggested that the
device would be ineffective because the trust would lack substantial
independent significance.106
It does not seem advisable to prescribe a specific minimum, and the
use of general language such as a requirement that the trust be "substantial" would invite litigation and thereby defeat one of the objectives of the proposal. In addition, too much emphasis has been placed
in the field of wills on the technique of looking beyond the form to the
substance of the transaction to defeat an attempted disposition of property.107 Courts have been too much concerned with attempts to "evade"
105 Fifth-Third

Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E. (2d) 920

(1946).
100

I ScOTI', TnusTs 300 (1939).

107 This appears in the occasional holdings

that an inter vivos trust is invalid because
it is in substance testamentary. McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 201 Mass. 50,
87 N.E. 465 (1909); Warsco v. Oshkosh Sav. & Tr. Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829
(1924). There has been a clear trend away from this view. The McEvoy case was expressly overruled in Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d)
113 (1944) and the rule of the Warsco case was changed by statute in Wisconsin (Wis.
Stat., 1949, §231.205). Recent decisions indicating the trend are Rose v. Union Guardian
Tr. Co., 300 Mich. 73, l N.W. (2d) 458 (1942); Whalen v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650,
4 N.W. (2d) 737 (1942); Central Tr. Co. v. Watt, 139 Ohio 50, 38 N.E. (2d) 185
(1941).
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the statute of wills. 108 The approach is valid in connection with many
statutes, but its use in wills cases, to defeat a disposition because it is
"in substance" testamentary, loses sight of the fact that what the decedent is attempting to "evade" is a statute designed for his own protection. The present proposal, therefore, makes it possible for the decedent, if he chooses, to make dispositions by trust amendments which
in substance are testamentary without complying with the formalities
: of existing wills statutes. The situation calls for legislation and the
legislative question is whether the less exacting requirement of a written amendment of the trust is sufficient in the circumstances to guard
against the dangers which the present wills statutes are aimed at. It
should be found that the requirement does suffice. Written amendments of an inter vivas trust have become a regularized form of conduct and the danger that they will not express the definitive and freely
formed wishes of the decedent is minimal.
5. The proposal is not limited to trusts established by the testator
during his lifetime. It applies to trusts established by others, including
community trusts. No attempt is made to cover bequests pursuant to
the terms of the will of another, although the statute would apply if
the bequest operated as a disposition to a trust created under the will
of another person who predeceased the testator. The authority of the
Fowles case is great enough to make unnecessary any general legislative provision on the matter.
108 "To sustain this will would be to perpetuate a fraud upon the next of kin, evade
the Statute of Wills and defeat the policy of the state." Reynolds v. Reynolds, 224 N.Y.
429 at 433, 121 N.E. 61 (1918). The court refused to decree a constructive trust in favor
of the intended beneficiaries where a legacy was given in trust without naming the beneficiaries in the will. The problem is discussed in note 24.

